In our country, the Airborne Forces enjoy well-deserved respect and unfading glory. Not everyone can serve them, but those who felt the strength of the military fraternity of “Uncle Vasya’s troops” will never forget about it. But even among the Airborne Forces, intelligence is something special. Scouts in the landing troops are honored more than others, since the lives of all the fighters participating in the operation often depend on their work.
Features of reconnaissance units of the Airborne Forces
In Soviet times, military doctrine prescribed the participation of landing troops in offensive operations. In them, the elite of the Airborne Forces, reconnaissance, was supposed to provide only a more or less "smooth" landing, with minimal casualties.
He assigned the tasks to the commander in chief of the district to which the corresponding unit was seconded. It was this person who was responsible for obtaining reliable and timely intelligence data. The Airborne Headquarters could order everything, including satellite images of the alleged landing areas, full descriptions of the captured objects (up to floor plans). The GRU specialists were directly responsible for providing this data.
When did the airborne fighters get down to business? Intelligence began to work only after landing, and supplied information exclusively to its units. And here we come to the most important thing: the Airborne Forces did not have an operational (!) Intelligence service, no matter how paradoxical it may sound. This played a cruel joke with the paratroopers: when their units began to participate in local conflicts in the 80s, it immediately became clear that the current organization was worthless.
Difficulties in obtaining information
Just imagine: intelligence (!) Received almost all operational information (route, weapons, equipment of the enemy) in the central office of the KGB, in the internal troops and even in the Ministry of Internal Affairs! Of course, in this state of affairs no one was surprised by either poorly confirmed data or delays in receiving them, and backstage intrigues spoiled the airborne troops a lot of blood …
Having suffered all the necessary information, the group flew to the landing site, studied the current situation on the spot, immediately marked out the route. Only after that did the data go to the commanders, on whom the reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces depended. The “bats ” from the GRU helped their colleagues as much as possible, but their possibilities were not unlimited: some specific information could be obtained only by the paratroopers themselves.
Very often it happened that the intelligence puffed out both for itself and for the main units: they not only paved the way for the group, but also constantly entered into fire contacts with the militants (which in itself is unacceptable under such conditions), making sure that they didn’t organize provocations, literally “by the hand” they carried out units of both the airborne forces and other military branches to the places of operations.
Due to the high losses and the unwillingness to perform such specific tasks, a separate battalion was created in the early 90s, which was tasked with performing operational intelligence activities. The creation of all the necessary "infrastructure" necessary for the successful fulfillment of the tasks set by the command belongs to the same period.
About technical equipment
How technically were the Airborne Forces equipped? Intelligence did not have anything particularly outstanding: for example, in Afghanistan, specialists had to do with ordinary binoculars and artillery compasses. Only there they received some types of radar stations, which were designed to detect moving targets, as well as laser range finders. It should be noted that Western scouts used these “modern” devices for a very long time, which Afghanistan proved in many ways. Reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces in action is a terrible force, but the amount of casualties in a collision with a better equipped enemy was still large.
A real gift was a series of portable direction finders: “Scuba-R / U / K”. Unlike the previously used equipment of this kind, this equipment made it possible to reliably detect radiation sources, the fighters were able to guarantee the interception of enemy negotiations on the HF and VHF waves, as well as at frequencies traditionally used by airborne reconnaissance. Bats, GRU special forces, also praised this technique.
Veterans recall that this technique provided invaluable assistance in locating gang groups and gangs that, before taking the Scuba gear into service, very often went along secret paths. The army command finally managed to convince the party elite to order the creation of a special reconnaissance vehicle designed specifically for the Airborne Forces, but the collapse of the Union prevented these plans from coming true. In principle, the Reostat machine used until then, which had good technical equipment, was also comfortable with the fighters.
The problem was that the weapons were not put on it, since initially it was intended for completely different purposes, which the Airborne Intelligence was not interested in. Afgan once again proved that all (!) Military equipment must have a full-time gun.
About what you did not receive
Despite the fact that the Afghan campaign clearly showed the vital need to equip the reconnaissance units with laser targeting weapons, it never appeared in the airborne forces (however, as in the entire SA). In fact, active army testing of such weapons began in the Union in the mid-80s, but there was one subtlety here. The fact is that “homing” does not mean the presence of intelligence in a rocket: aiming is carried out according to a laser “pointer”, which is adjusted from the ground or water. Scouts were ideal candidates for working with laser fire spotters, but our army did not have them.
Paratroopers (as well as simple infantry, however) often had to master aviation "jargon". So it was possible to much more accurately direct attack aircraft and helicopters at the target using a conventional walkie-talkie. And we ourselves didn’t want to fall under the “friendly” fire ourselves. The Americans already had a different story then: they had means of indicating targets that, in a truly automatic mode, having received data from ground services, could direct combat aircraft and helicopters to the target.
The well-equipped Iraqi troops during the “Desert Storm” were completely defeated: US troops simply “stacked” missiles with precise guidance on their tanks. There was practically no risk, but Iraq was almost immediately left without heavy armored vehicles. Our deep reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces could only envy them.
Chechen weekdays
If in Afghanistan intelligence was really engaged in truly specialized activities, then in Chechnya the fighters again became “broad-based specialists”: often they had to not only detect, but also destroy the militants. Chronically, there were not enough specialists, many types of troops had neither equipment nor trained fighters at all, and therefore the Airborne Forces (reconnaissance in particular) were officially redesigned to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage activities.
Fortunately, by 1995, the completion of the 45th Special Purpose Regiment (which had become a legend) was almost completed. The uniqueness of this unit is that when it was created, it was not only studied, but also actively used in practice, the experience of all foreign armies. Taking into account the lessons of Afghanistan, the prepared groups were immediately trained not only for reconnaissance, but also for direct fire engagements with the enemy.
For this, the 45th regiment was immediately transferred the necessary amount of medium and heavy armored vehicles. In addition, the paratroopers finally got “Nona” - unique mortar and artillery systems that allow firing shells with "honest" homing ("Kitolov-2").
Finally, in the intelligence units of other airborne regiments (military intelligence went far ahead in this regard), finally, line units were created. To equip them, BTR-80s were transferred, which were used only as reconnaissance vehicles (there were no fighters in the airborne squad), and calculations of AGS (automatic grenade launchers) and flamethrower systems were actively prepared and coordinated.
There was another difficulty. Our fighters immediately began to say that Ukrainian airborne reconnaissance (from selected nationalists) was participating in the war on the side of the militants. Since some specialists trained fighters, even friends often met in battle.
Why was all this done?
All these events made it possible in the shortest possible time to prepare for the exits groups prepared and equipped to carry out combat missions in difficult mountainous conditions. Moreover, these units had a sufficient amount of heavy weapons, which, when detecting large concentrations of the enemy, allowed not only to report on their deployment, but also to engage in battle on their own. Armor, however, often helped out scouts who suddenly clashed with superior enemy forces.
It was the experience of the landing troops that gave impetus to the re-equipment of the reconnaissance units of other branches of the army, which also received heavy armored vehicles. The fact is that reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces in action proved that a couple of armored personnel carriers can greatly improve the effectiveness of military operations.
Drones
It was in the 45th regiment for the first time in our history that the combat tests of UAVs began, which are now a real "hit" among the same Americans. A domestic UAV appeared far from empty: from the end of the 80s, the Stroy-P reconnaissance complex was under active development, the main “olfactory feeling” of which was to be the Pchela-1T aircraft.
Unfortunately, before the start of the war he was never brought to mind, since the method of landing was not thought out. But already in April, the first "Stroy-P" went to Khankala. Five “Bees” were attached to it at once. Tests immediately proved the highest effectiveness of such weapons in modern wars. So, it was possible to pin all the identified positions of the militants to the map with an accuracy of just a centimeter, which was immediately appreciated by the gunners.
Operating difficulties
A total of 18 launches were made, all of which were carried out in the mountains, in which military reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces was forced to operate most often. The military immediately began to claim the chassis of the Bees. However, the technicians were able to achieve satisfactory operation of the engines, after which the depth of exploration immediately increased to 50 kilometers or more.
To the great regret, the difficulties of the 90s led to the fact that in the whole country only 18 Bee-1T devices were in service. Ten of them were stored at the base of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea, where tests were launched to launch them from the deck of the ships. Alas, they were not treated there in the best way: the design bureau had to work hard to bring the Bees to a condition after they were stored in unsuitable conditions.
In the end, 15 vehicles began flying in the Chechen mountains. Two by that time were lost in combat conditions, and one “Black Sea” was never restored.
Gold or drones
It was originally planned that at least a hundred such vehicles would be in service with the Airborne Intelligence Service throughout the country. The joyful military immediately handed over all the technical documentation for their production to the Smolensk Aviation Plant. The labor proletarians immediately disappointed them: even according to the most modest estimates, unmanned vehicles turned out to be almost more expensive than gold.
Because of this, production was abandoned. The other 15 devices served the scouts to fame: they were taken to restore to the design bureau, they were again launched and invariably received the most accurate information that the landing party could not always get. The reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces is very grateful to the developers of Bees, as hardworking machines have saved many lives.
Scout propagandists
Alas, the reconnaissance command was far from always able to correctly use all the means that he had at his disposal. So, at one time at least five dozen people, specialists in “psychological operations” were transferred to Mozdok. At their disposal was a mobile printing house and a transceiver television center. With the help of the latter, intelligence services planned to broadcast propaganda materials.
But the command did not stipulate that full-time specialists could provide a television broadcast, but there were no operators and correspondents in the detachment. With the flyers, things turned out even worse. They turned out to be so poor in content and appearance that they caused only despondency. In general, the position of specialists in psychological work was not among the scouts among the scouts.
Logistics and supply issues
Beginning with the first campaign, the disgusting equipment of the reconnaissance groups of the airborne forces (and other military branches, too) began to affect, which contributed to an increase in injuries and an increased risk of detection. As a result, the paratroopers had to attract veterans who raised funds to equip their colleagues. Alas, the Second Chechen War was characterized by exactly the same problems. So, in 2008, the Union of Paratroopers raised money for convenient unloading, imported shoes, sleeping bags and even medical supplies …
How has the training of reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces since Soviet times
Unlike in previous years, the command began to pay much more attention to the training of small reconnaissance and combat groups. It finally became clear that in modern conditions they are much more important than divisions. Simply put, the role of individual training of each soldier has sharply increased, which is simply vital for scouts, since each of them can rely solely on their own forces in combat output.
What remains unchanged is the Chevrons of the Airborne Forces Intelligence: they depict a bat (like the GRU). In 2005, a decree was issued that ordered all intelligence agencies to switch to a chevron with an image of an eagle clutching a clove and a black arrow in its paws, but so far there has not been much progress in this direction. Of course, the form of reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces has completely changed: it has become much more convenient, a regular unloading has appeared in it.
Correspondence of the airborne reconnaissance to modern realities
Experts say that today the situation is not too rosy. Of course, the process of rearmament that has begun is pleasing, but the technical equipment does not reach generally accepted standards.
So, among Americans, up to ¼ of the personnel of a division of any kind of troops belong precisely to intelligence. We have a share of personnel who can engage in such operations, at best, is 8-9%. The difficulty is also that earlier there were separate reconnaissance battalions in which trained first-class specialists. Now there are only specialized companies, the level of training of personnel in which is far from so high.
